Secure wireless communication

ABSTRACT

In one embodiment, the method performed by mobile equipment to authenticate communication with a network includes generating keys using cellular authentication and voice encryption, and then generating an authentication key based on these keys. The authentication key is used to generate an expected message authentication code used in authenticating the network according to authentication and key agreement security protocol.

PRIORITY STATEMENT

This application claims the benefit of priority under 35 U.S.C. §119(e) to U.S. provisional application No. 60/998,125 filed Oct. 9, 2007, the entire contents of this application is incorporated herein by reference.

BACKGROUND

1. Field the of the Invention

The present invention relates to a method and system for secure wireless communications. In particular, the present invention relates to a method of establishing authentication keys at both the network and mobile equipment in order to establish a mutually authenticated communication channel.

2. Description of Related Art

Security methods and processes relating to wireless communications have evolved in recent years. In particular, 2G CDMA security evolved into 3G CDMA security.

As is well known in the art, 2G CDMA security involves cellular authentication and voice encryption (CAVE). In particular, 2G CDMA security uses at least a root key commonly referred to as an AKey and shared secret data (SSD) keys. The SSD keys are generated via a well-known SSD update procedure. The SSD keys are semi long term keys and are treated as root keys herein. The SSD keys may be shared with a Visitor Location Register (VLR) of a network if the VLR is the home serving system for a mobile equipment, for example. Further, conventional 2G CDMA security protocols may involve a global challenge and response procedure and a unique challenge and response procedure.

For the global challenge procedure, the network broadcasts a random challenge RAND to the mobile equipment. A mobile equipment performing system access (e.g. registration, call origination, and call termination) in a network that requires authentication, creates and sends an authentication response AUTHR using a long term key. The pair RAND/AUTHR is forwarded to the Home Location Register/Authentication Center (HLR/AC) for verification. Also for calls of type call origination, the last 6 digits are used in calculating AUTHR. For both call origination and call termination the mobile generates keys that are useful for the call (i.e., SMEKEY and PLCM). The HLR/AC also generates and returns to the VLR the SMEKEY and PLCM if the RAND/AUTHR pair verifies.

A unique challenge procedure can be performed by the network attempting to communicate with a mobile equipment at any time on either the control channel or traffic channel. For example, the VLR requests a unique challenge and expected response pair, RANDU and AUTHU from the HLR/AC. The network sends the RANDU to the mobile equipment and the mobile equipment calculates a response AUTHU using a long term key and sends a response AUTHU to the network. The network verifies the RANDU/AUTHU pair.

Conventional 3G CDMA security protocols are based on an authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol and provide mutual authentication meaning (i) the mobile equipment authenticates the network and (ii) the network authenticates the mobile equipment before communications are performed. The well-known AKA security protocols used in 3G CDMA are based on quintuplets. Quintuplets include a random number RAND, expected response XRES, cipher key CK, integrity key IK and network authentication token AUTN. A conventional network authentication token AUTN is based on a sequence number SQN, an anonymity key AK, authentication management field AMF and a message authentication code (MAC).

For example, the mobile equipment generates its own MAC based on a sequence number SQN stored in the mobile equipment, a secret key K stored in the mobile equipment, the AMF, and the random number RAND. Then, the MAC generated at the mobile equipment is compared with the MAC extracted from the network authentication token AUTN received from the serving system. Still further, the mobile equipment may determine if the sequence number SQN extracted from the network authentication token is an acceptable value. If the mobile equipment successfully authenticates the network, the mobile equipment prepares a response RES and transmits the response RES back to the serving system of the network. The serving system of the network then compares the expected response XRES with the response RES to authenticate the mobile equipment, thereby completing mutual authentication according to the conventional AKA security protocol.

If the mobile equipment during the authentication process determines the MAC, which was extracted from the network authentication token AUTN, does not match the MAC generated in the mobile equipment, the mobile equipment transmits a failure message to the serving system of the network. Further, if the mobile equipment, during the authentication process, determines the MAC value, which was extracted from the network authentication token AUTN matches the MAC value generated by the mobile equipment, but that the sequence number SQN is outside of the permissible range, the mobile equipment transmits a resynchronization message to the network. The AKA security protocol briefly described above and used in 3G CDMA is well known in the art and thus, further information is not provided herein for the sake of brevity.

While security protocols have evolved by transitioning from 2G CDMA security protocols to 3G CDMA security protocols, which are also implemented in some conventional IMS security protocols, some of the hardware equipment used for wireless communications has not been updated and/or is not capable of processing the more highly evolved protocols. For example, some companies which may have invested significant amounts of time, research and money in hardware used to process 2G CDMA security protocols have chosen not to update the hardware for various cost associated reasons. Therefore, some conventional 2G CDMA hardware devices are not currently capable of providing a mutually authenticated communication channel using the AKA security protocols of conventional 3G CDMA.

Accordingly, proposals have been made, which attempt to establish a mutually authenticated communication channel without using the quintuplet based AKA security protocol described above with respect to 3G CDMA. Stated differently, these proposals are attempting to use IS-41 authentication procedures previously used in 2G CDMA security protocols. However, all of these proposals suffer from at least the following deficiency. In particular, a compromise of a past IS-41 session key (e.g., SMEKEY and PLCM) would allow an attacker to replay a random number and successfully complete the key agreement protocol and communicate with a mobile equipment or a network. As such, these proposals are insecure when a previously used IS-41 session key is revealed.

SUMMARY

Example embodiments provide methods and apparatuses related to establishing communications between mobile equipment and a network that leverages ANSI-41 security protocols.

In one embodiment, the method performed by mobile equipment to authenticate communication with a network includes receiving authentication information from a network, and obtaining a first random number from the received authentication information. The first random number is a random number that the network associates with the mobile equipment. At least one mobile equipment key is generated based on the first random number using cellular authentication and voice encryption. A second random number is obtained from the received authentication information. The second random number is associated with the network. At least one network key is generated from the second random number using the cellular authentication and voice encryption. An authentication key is generated based on the mobile equipment key and the network key. An expected network message authentication code is generated based on the authentication key and at least a portion of the received authentication information according to authentication and key agreement security protocol. The network is authenticated based on the expected network message authentication code.

In another embodiment, a method performed by a network to establish the network with a mobile equipment includes generating a challenge. The challenge includes a sequence number field, an authentication management field, and a random number field. The sequence number field includes a sequence number and a portion of a first random number the network associates with the mobile equipment. The authentication management field includes another portion of the first random number, and the random number field includes a second random number and a further portion of the first random number. The embodiment further includes obtaining at least one mobile equipment key using the first random number, obtaining at least one network key using a second random number, and generating an authentication key based on the mobile equipment key and the network key. A first message authentication code is generated based on the authentication key according to authentication and key agreement security protocol, and an authentication token is generated based on the sequence number in the sequence number field, the authentication management field and the first message authentication code. The challenge and the authentication token are sent to the mobile equipment.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention will become more fully understood from the detailed description given herein below and the accompanying drawings, wherein like elements are represented by like reference numerals, which are given by way of illustration only and thus are not limiting of the present invention and wherein:

FIG. 1 illustrates a communication system according to an example embodiment.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example embodiment of a mobile equipment.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example embodiment of a random number RANDM having a longer length than random numbers conventionally used in establishing communication channels.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example embodiment of an AKA challenge, which may be generated by a home subscriber server (HSS) and used by both a HSS and a mobile equipment in order to establish a mutually authenticated communication channel between the HSS 400 and mobile equipment.

FIG. 5 is a hybrid of a flowchart and signaling diagram illustrating an example embodiment of operations performed by and communications between the HSS, HLR/AC and mobile equipment to form a mutually authenticated communication channel.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating example operation of the mobile equipment in authenticating the HSS.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS

FIG. 1 illustrates a communication system 10 including at least one mobile equipment (ME) 100 a home location register (HLR) 300 and a home subscribing server (HSS) 400. One skilled in the art will appreciate that the communication system 10 illustrated in FIG. 1 is simplified and would include various intermediary components used to communicate between the ME 100, the HLR/AC 300 and the HSS 400. The location of the ME 100, type of service requested by the ME 100, etc., may determine whether the HLR 300 or the HSS 400 provides a requested service to the ME 100.

According to the example embodiment as described with respect to FIG. 1, the HLR 300 includes an authentication center (AC) 310. One skilled in the art will appreciate the HLR 300 and the AC 310 may be separate and distinct components of the communication system instead of the AC 310 being included with the HLR 300 as shown in FIG. 1. In the remainder of this application the HLR 300 and authentication center 310 will be referred to collectively as a Location Register/Authentication Center (HLR/AC). The HLR/AC 300 includes functionality to perform well-known 2G CDMA security procedures such as cellular authentication and voice encryption (CAVE).

According to the example embodiment, HSS 400 may behave as a visiting location register (VLR) with respect to the HLR/AC 300, and leverage the 2G CDMA security functionality of the HLR/AC 300 to establish a mutually authenticated communication channel without having any AKA crypto-graphic keys agreed upon a priori with the ME 100.

FIG. 2 illustrates an example embodiment of ME 100. As shown in FIG. 2, the ME 100 includes a user identity module (UIM), a memory 120, a processor 130 and a transceiver 140. The UIM may be a conventional user identity module. Alternatively, one skilled in the art will appreciate the UIM of ME 100 could be a conventional removable user identity module (RUIM). For example, the UIM may be a module that was developed to function according to the 2G CDMA security protocols. As such, the UIM may store a MIN/IMSI/TMSI as is well known in the art and will not be discussed further herein for the sake of brevity.

The memory 120, the processor 130 and the transceiver 140 may be used in conjunction with the UIM to perform example embodiments of methods described below with respect to FIGS. 3 and 4. For ease of explanation, the memory 120, the processor 130 and the transceiver 140 are collectively referred to as ME in example embodiments described below.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example embodiment of a random number RANDM having a longer length than random numbers conventionally used in establishing communication channels. The ME 100 generates the random number RANDM. For example, generation of the random number RANDM is triggered upon insertion of a UIM into the ME 100 and/or in response to a signal received from the HSS 400. The random number RANDM shown in FIG. 3 includes 72 bits. In particular, the random number RANDM includes 20 random bits, 32 bits used in cellular authentication and voice encryption (CAVE), and 20 bits representing 6 call digits, for example. Hereafter, the random number RANDM generated by the ME 100 and stored in the ME is referred to as RANDM_(ME), and the subscript ME indicates the random number is stored in the ME 100. This random number RANDM_(ME) is communicated to the HSS 400, and stored at the HSS 400 as the RANDM_(HSS).

FIG. 4 illustrates an example embodiment of an AKA challenge, which may be generated by the HSS 400 and used by both a HSS 400 and a ME 100 in order to establish a mutually authenticated communication channel between the HSS 400 and ME 100. As shown in FIG. 4, the AKA challenge includes the random number RANDM of the format shown in FIG. 3. However, because the random number RANDM included in the AKA challenge is a random number RANDM stored in the HSS 400, the random number is referred to as RANDM_(HSS). Similarly, the random number RANDM stored in the ME is referred to as RANDM_(ME). The AKA challenge provides increased security at least in part based on a random number RANDM having a longer length than random numbers conventionally used in establishing communication channels.

As shown in FIG. 4, the AKA challenge includes a sequence number (SQN) field, an authentication management field (AMF) and an authentication key agreement random number (AKA_RAND) field. At least a portion of each of the SQN field, AMF, and AKA_RAND field includes a number of bits of the RANDM_(HSS) previously stored in the HSS 400 and used to generate the AKA challenge.

Referring to FIG. 4, the SQN field includes at least a portion of a sequence number stored in the HSS 400 (SQN_(HSS)), an indicator or flag (R), and a portion of the random number RANDM_(HSS). In particular, the SQN field has a total of 48 bits including 16 bits of the SQN_(HSS), 1 bit for the indicator, and 31 bits of the RANDM_(HSS). The SQN field is one of the inputs to a function used to generate a message authentication code (MAC).

The indicator R of the SQN field is used by the HSS 400 in order to trigger the ME 100 to generate and store a new random number RANDM_(ME). As previously indicated, the random number RANDM_(ME) may be 72 bits. For example, if the indicator R is a “1”, the ME 100 generates and stores a new random number RANDM_(ME), whereas if the indicator is a “0” the ME 100 does not generate and store a new random number RANDM_(ME).

Still referring to FIG. 4, the AMF includes 16 bits of the random number stored in the HSS 400 RANDM_(HSS). The AMF is another one of the inputs to a function used to calculate a MAC.

The AKA_RAND field includes a portion of the random number RANDM_(HSS) stored in the HSS 400, and random bits generated by the HSS 400. In particular, the AKA_RAND field includes 128 bits. The 128 bits of the AKA_RAND field includes 25 bits of the random number RANDM_(HSS), a unique challenge RANDU including 24 bits and 79 other bits generated by the HSS 400.

Operations performed and communications involving the AKA challenge shown in FIG. 4 and/or information extracted from the AKA challenge are now described with respect to FIG. 5.

FIG. 5 is a hybrid of a flowchart and signaling diagram illustrating example embodiments of operations performed by and communications between the HSS 400, the HLR/AC 300 and the ME 100.

As shown, the As is well-known, the HSS 400 obtains the well-known random number pair RANDU/AUTHU in cooperation with the HLR/AC 300. The HSS 400 sends the RANDU/AUTHU pair as the well-known RANDU/AUTHR to the HLR/AC 300 to obtain the network keys KEYSN_(HSS) such as SMEKEY and PLCM. Namely, the HSS 400 leverages the 2G CDMA security functionality of the HLR/AC 300. The HLR/AC 300 generates the network keys KEYSN_(HSS) according to CAVE, and returns the network keys KEYSN_(HSS) to the HSS 400.

Similarly, the HSS 400 sends the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) to the HLR/AC 300. As discussed above, the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) may have been previously received from the ME as RANDM_(ME) and stored in the HSS 400 as the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS). Namely, the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) is a random number that the network associates with the mobile equipment. The HLR/AC 300 performs the CAVE operation on the RANDM_(HSS) to generate mobile equipment keys KEYSM_(HSS) such as the SMEKEY and PLCM.

It may be that a mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) is not available at the HSS 400; for example, the mobile random number RANDM_(ME) was not previously received or has been deleted from the HSS 400. In this case, the network will create the random number RANDM_(HSS). For example, the HSS 400 may create a second random number RANDN and use this second random number RANDN as the CAVE RAND portion (See FIG. 3) of the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) stored in the HSS 400. Further, the HSS 400 may generate random bits to be included in the random section of the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) stored in the HSS 400, as well as set the bits of the call digit section of the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) to all ones “1”. It is noted that including all ones in the call digit section of the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) sent in a challenge could indicate to the ME information about the RANDN.

Returning to FIG. 5, in step S550, the HSS 400 generates an authentication key AKA_key. For example, the authentication key AKA_key may be a hash of the network keys KEYSN_(HSS) and mobile KEYSM_(HSS) as shown by the following equation: AKA_key=H₁ (KEYSM_(HSS), KEYSN_(HSS)). In step S560, the HSS 400 uses the AKA_KEY according to 3G CDMA authentication and key agreement protocols along with the RANDU, the values of the AMF and the sequence number SQN_(HSS) to generate a message authentication code MAC_(HSS) that is stored in the HSS 400.

The HSS then generates the challenge of FIG. 4 and the authorization token AUTN in step S570. The authorization token AUTN is formed to include an anonymity key AK, the sequence number SQN_(HSS), the authentication management field AMF and the message authentication code MAC_(HSS). The challenge and authorization token AUTN are sent to the ME 100.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating example operation of the mobile equipment in authenticating the HSS upon receipt of the challenge and authorization token AUTN. In particular, the transceiver 140 of the ME 100 receives the challenge and token from the HSS 400 and provides the information to the processor 130 for processing and/or memory 120 for storage.

As shown in FIG. 6, In step S610, the ME 100 extracts the RANDU from the AKA_RAND field of the received challenge, and the ME 100 may use the extracted random number RANDU to generate network keys KEYSN_(ME) such as the PLCM and the SMEKEY. As previously mentioned, the generation of keys based on a random number is well-known in the art and may be readily performed by a UIM of the ME 100 using CAVE. It will be appreciated that the ME 100 and HLR/AC 300 generate the network keys KEYSN in the same fashion.

Further, the processor 130 of the ME extracts in step S620 the random number RANDM_(HSS) from the received challenge, and the processor 130 generates the mobile keys KEYSM_(ME). Again, the ME 100 uses CAVE on the RANDM_(HSS) to generate the mobile keys KEYSM_(ME). Alternatively, the mobile keys KEYSM_(ME) may have already been generated based on RANDM_(ME) and stored in the memory 140 of the ME 100. For example, the processor 130 sets the 20 least significant bits as six dialed digits, next 32 least significant bits as a CAVE RAND and provides this information to the UIM in order to obtain a mobile authentication response AUTHM and the mobile keys KEYSM_(ME).

Once both the network keys KEYSN_(ME) and the mobile keys KEYSM_(ME) are obtained by the ME 100, the ME 100 generates the authentication key AKA_key in step S630. For example, the authentication key AKA_key may be a hash of the network keys KEYSN_(ME) and mobile KEYSM_(ME) as shown by the following equation: AKA_key=H₁(KEYSN_(ME), KEYSN_(ME)).

In step S640, the ME 100 then generates the expected message authentication code XMAC. The expected message authentication code XMAC is generated by the ME 100 using the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) from the SQN portion of the AKA challenge and the authentication key AKA_key generated and stored in the ME 100 according to 3G CDMA authentication and key agreement security protocols.

The ME 100 then compares the expected message authentication code XMAC with the MACM_(HSS) obtained from the authentication token AUTN in step S650. If the expected message authentication code XMAC and the MACM_(HSS) associated with the HSS 400 do not match, the ME 100 sends an authentication failure to the HSS 400 as shown in FIG. 6, and the security protocol is aborted. Alternatively, if the expected message authentication code XMAC and the MACM_(HSS) associated with the HSS 400 do match, the method shown in FIG. 6 proceeds to step S660.

In step S660, the ME 100 determines if the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) received from the HSS 400 in the AKA challenge matches the mobile random number RANDM_(ME) stored in the ME 100. If the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) received from the HSS 400 does not match the mobile random number RANDM_(ME) stored in the memory 140 of the ME 100, the ME 100 generates and sends a resynchronization message in step S670. As shown in FIG. 6, the resynchronization message includes a sequence number SQN_(RESYNC) field and a MACS field.

According to an example embodiment, the resynchronization message includes the mobile random number RANDM_(ME) stored in the ME 100. For example, in FIG. 6, the sequence number field includes 48 bits of the RANDM_(ME) and the MACS field includes 24 bits of the mobile random number RANDM_(ME). In addition, the MACS field includes 18 bits of a mobile authentication response AUTHRM that are XORed with 18 bits of the MACS, as well as 22 bits of the MACS. Generation of a mobile authentication response AUTHRM is well-known in the art and thus not discussed herein for the sake of brevity.

In response to receiving the resynchronization message, the HSS 400 generates a MACS_(HSS) using the authentication key AKA_key in order to verify the ME 100. In particular, the HSS 400 performs a pseudo random function using the previously generated authentication key AKA_key, the mobile random number RANDM_(HSS) stored in the HSS 400, and the random number AKA_RAND stored in the HSS 400.

The HSS 400 then compares the MACS_(HSS) with the MACS received in the resynchronization message provided by the ME 100. For example, the HSS 400 may extract the 22 least significant bits of the MACS received in the resynchronization message and compare the extracted 22 bits with the 22 least significant bits of the MACS_(HSS).

In addition, the HSS 400 extracts the mobile authentication response AUTHRM received from the ME 100 by XORing the next 18 bits of the MACS. According to an example embodiment, the HSS 400 then sends the AUTHRM along with additional information to the HLR/AC 300 to verify the ME 100 and obtain new mobile keys KEYSM_(HSS). The additional information includes a CAVE RANDM_(ME) and call digits, for example. If the mobile authentication response is verified by the HLR/AC 300, 18 bits of the MACS are also verified and thus, a total of 40 bits are verified.

Alternatively, if in step S660, the RANDM_(HSS) is equal to the RANDM_(ME), the method shown in FIG. 6 proceeds to step S680. In step S680, the ME 100 determines if the sequence number SQN is acceptable. The sequence number SQN associated with the current authentication process is compared to a sequence number SQN_(ME) previously stored in the ME 100. For example, the sequence number SQN associated with the current authentication process should be greater than the sequence number SQN_(ME) previously stored in the ME 100, but within a certain range. Stated differently, the sequence number SQN associated with the current authentication process should be greater than the sequence number SQN_(ME) previously stored in the ME 100 and less than an upper limit of a permissible sequence number SQN_(ME)+Δ, i.e., SQNMD<SQN<SQNME+Δ, wherein Δ is an integer value.

If in step S680, the sequence number SQN is determined to be outside of a permissible range, the ME 100 sends a resynchronization message in step S690. As shown in FIG. 6, the resynchronization message includes a sequence number SQN_(RESYNC) field and a MACS field. For example, the SQN_(RESYNC) field of the resynchronization message may include zeroes for the 32 most significant bits of a 48 bit sequence number and the 16 least significant bits of the 48 bit sequence number may be set to a sequence number SQN_(ME) previously stored in the ME 100. As previously discussed, the ME 100 generates an AKA_KEY based on the received challenge. The generated AKA_key is used to calculate a MACS, which is included in the MACS field of the resynchronization message.

The HSS 400 receives the resynchronization message generated because the sequence number SQN was determined to be outside of a permissible range. The HSS 400 processes the received resynchronization message. For example, the HSS 400 may be configured to recognize that the 32 most significant bits of the 48 bit sequence number included in the sequence resynchronization field SQN_(RESYNC) being set to zeroes indicates that the resynchronization message includes a sequence number SQN_(ME) stored in the ME 100. Accordingly, the HSS 400 stores the sequence number SQN_(ME) for future use. However, the HSS 400 also verifies the ME 100 using the 64 bit MACS included in the MACS field as was discussed above.

If, in step S680, the ME 100 determines the sequence number SQN associated with the current authentication operation is within a permissible range, the ME 100 generates a response message RES in step S700. The generation of a response message RES based on a random number and a secret key stored in the ME is well known in the art and thus, is not discussed herein for the sake of brevity. The ME 100 also calculates a cipher key CK and integrity key IK based on the random number and the secret key. The calculation of a cipher key CK and integrity key IK is also well known in the art.

Returning to FIG. 5, the ME 100 sends the response message RES to the HSS 400. The HSS 400 will have already generated an expected response message XRES in step S580 in the well-known manner. In step S590, the HSS or a network entity on behalf of the HSS 400 compares the response message to the expected response message XRES. If no match exists, authentication fails. However, a match does exist, then in the HSS 400 and the ME 100 establish a mutually authenticated communication channel.

The methods and apparatuses and systems described above provide at least 64 bit security guarantees. Further, during challenge formation, the methods involve sending both the random number from the mobile equipment and the network. An authentication key agreement (AKA) key is based on CDMA keys from challenges. Still further, the mobile equipment regenerates a 72 bit random number associated with the mobile equipment only at UIM insertion and not during resynchronization. During resynchronization, either the 72 bit random number generated or stored in the mobile equipment is sent or a 16 bit sequence number is sent. The network verifies and accepts the resynchronization message and stores the 72 bit random number provided by the mobile equipment. Still further, when sending a challenge, the network uses a 72 bit random number the network associates with the mobile equipment and a newly created random number to create CDMA keys which in turn create an AKA key. The AKA key is used with standard AKA functions to create a MAC, RES, CK and IK.

The invention being thus described, it will be obvious that the same may be varied in many ways. Such variations are not to be regarded as a departure from the spirit and scope of the invention, and all such modifications as would be obvious to one skilled in the art are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention. 

1. A method performed by mobile equipment to authenticate communication with a network, the method comprising: receiving, at the mobile equipment, authentication information from a network; obtaining, at the mobile equipment, a first random number from the received authentication information, the first random number being a random number that the mobile equipment had sent the network; generating, at the mobile equipment, at least one mobile equipment key based on the first random number using cellular authentication and voice encryption; obtaining, at the mobile equipment, a second random number from the received authentication information, the second random number being associated with the network; generating, at the mobile equipment, at least one network key from the second random number using the cellular authentication and voice encryption; generating, at the mobile equipment, an authentication key that includes hashing together the mobile equipment key and the network key; generating, at the mobile equipment, an expected network message authentication code based on the authentication key and at least a portion of the received authentication information according to authentication and key agreement security protocol; and authenticating the network based on the expected network message authentication code.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the authenticating step comprises: obtaining a message authentication code from the received authentication information; and comparing the expected message authentication code to the obtained message authentication code.
 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the authenticating step further comprises: comparing the first random number with a third random number stored in the mobile equipment; and sending a resynchronization message to the network if the first random number does not match the third random number.
 4. The method of claim 3, wherein the resynchronization message includes at least a portion of the third random number.
 5. The method of claim 2, wherein the received authentication information includes a sequence number field, an authentication management field, and an authentication key agreement random number field, and further comprising: determining if a sequence number in the sequence number field is within a permissible range; and sending a resynchronization message if the sequence number is determined not to be within the permissible range.
 6. The method of claim 5, wherein the resynchronization message includes a sequence number stored in the mobile equipment.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the received authentication information includes a sequence number field, an authentication management field, and an authentication key agreement random number field, and further comprising: obtaining a message authentication code from the received authentication information; comparing the expected message authentication code to the obtained message authentication code; comparing the first random number with a third random number stored in the mobile equipment; and determining if a sequence number in the sequence number field is within a permissible range; and sending an authentication response to the network if the expected message authentication code matches the obtained message authentication code, the first random number matches the third random number, and the sequence number field is within the permissible range.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the received authentication information includes a sequence number field, an authentication management field, and an authentication key agreement random number field; and the first random number includes a portion of the sequence number field, the authentication management field and a portion of the authentication key agreement random number field.
 9. The method of claim 8, wherein the first random number has a length of at least 64 bits.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein the authentication key is a 128-bit authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol key.
 11. A method performed by a network to establish the network with a mobile equipment, the method comprising: generating, at a network node, a challenge including a sequence number field, an authentication management field, and a random number field, the sequence number field including a sequence number and a portion of a first random number the network had received from the mobile equipment, the authentication management field including another portion of the first random number, and the random number field includes a second random number and a further portion of the first random number; and obtaining, at the network node, at least one mobile equipment key using the first random number; obtaining, at the network node, at least one network key using a second random number; generating, at the network node, an authentication key that includes hashing together the mobile equipment key and the network key; generating, at the network node, a first message authentication code based on the authentication key according to authentication and key agreement security protocol; generating, at the network node, an authentication token based on the sequence number in the sequence number field, the authentication management field and the first message authentication code; sending, at the network node, the challenge and the authentication token to the mobile equipment.
 12. The method of claim 11, further comprising: receiving a response to the challenge and authentication token from the mobile equipment; and establishing a mutually authenticated communication channel with the mobile equipment based on the response.
 13. The method of claim 11, wherein the sequence number field includes a flag controlling whether the mobile equipment generates a new random number for use during authentication.
 14. The method of claim 11, further comprising: receiving a resynchronization message from the mobile equipment, the resynchronization message includes a third random number and a second message authentication code.
 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the second random number included in the resynchronization message has a length of at least 64 bits.
 16. The method of claim 14, further comprising: verifying the mobile equipment based on the second message authentication code; and storing the second random number for generating another challenge for the mobile equipment if the mobile equipment is verified.
 17. The method of claim 11, further comprising: receiving a resynchronization message from the mobile equipment, the resynchronization message includes a number of bits indicating the resynchronization message includes a sequence number associated with the mobile equipment, the resynchronization message further includes the sequence number associated with the mobile equipment and a second message authentication code.
 18. The method of claim 17, further comprising: verifying the mobile equipment based on the second message authentication code; and storing the sequence number associated with the mobile equipment for generating another challenge if the mobile equipment is verified.
 19. The method of claim 11, wherein the authentication key is a 128-bit authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol key. 